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ABSTRACT 
This Article analyzes how the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in the Westboro Baptist Church 
funeral-protest case of Snyder v. Phelps is now affecting lawsuits brought against media 
defendants for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED).  The pro-First Amendment result 
three years ago in Snyder pivoted largely on the Court’s expansive definition of “public concern.”  
Using a quartet of post-Snyder cases as analytical springboards, the article examines how Snyder 
and the concept of public concern are being deployed by both courts and media defense attorneys in 
IIED cases premised upon the publication of allegedly outrageous speech.  Ultimately, none of the 
judges in the post-Snyder cases studied here heeded Chief Justice John Roberts’ statement that 
Snyder should be viewed narrowly.  Instead, the notion of public concern was broadly stretched far 
beyond the factual confines of Snyder.  In only one case, in fact, did a Snyder-based, public-
concern defense not win the day. 
INTRODUCTION 
This Article examines how the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2011 deci-
sion in Snyder v. Phelps,1 with its heavy emphasis on safeguarding 
speech about matters of public concern,2 is now affecting lawsuits for 
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 1 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). 
 2 See id. at 1215–16 (reasoning that the “case turns largely on whether that speech is of pub-
lic or private concern,” emphasizing that speech about matters of public concern is “‘at 
the heart of the First Amendment’s’” guarantee of free expression, noting that “restrict-
ing speech on purely private matters does not implicate the same constitutional concerns 
as limiting speech on matters of public interest[,]” and identifying three factors—the 
content, form, and context of speech—for courts to consider in deciding if speech is 
about a matter of public or private concern (internal citations omitted)).  It has been ob-
served that the Snyder court’s distinction between matters of public and private concern 
“proved crucial” in the case.  James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of 
American Free Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491, 495 (2011); see also Aaron H. Caplan, Free 
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intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED)3 and outrage4 filed 
against media defendants.  Citing First Amendment5 concerns about 
free expression, the Court in Snyder appeared to substantially cabin 
and confine the viability of IIED in private-figure plaintiff cases6 pivot-
ing on speech addressing matters of public concern.7  Professor Nat 
Stern observed, for example, that the Court’s conclusion that the 
speech “amounted to commentary on matters of public concern 
proved central to its ruling that the speech was protected.”8 
As for the projected impact of Snyder’s public-concern-centric fo-
cus on the future of the IIED tort, Professor Elizabeth Jaffe asserted, 
the same year of the decision, that Snyder renders IIED “all but obso-
lete”9 in such situations.10  University of Florida Professor Lyrissa Lid-
 
Speech and Civil Harassment Orders, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 781, 823 (2013) (noting that the court 
in Snyder “emphasized that Westboro’s speech related to topics of public concern”). 
 3 IIED typically “consists of four elements:  (1) the defendant’s conduct must be intention-
al or reckless, (2) the conduct must be outrageous and intolerable, (3) the defendant’s 
conduct must cause the plaintiff emotional distress and (4) the distress must be severe.”  
Karen Markin, The Truth Hurts:  Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress as a Cause of Action 
Against the Media, 5 COMM. L. & POL’Y 469, 476 (2000); see, e.g., Harris v. Kreutzer, 624 S.E. 
2d 24, 33 (Va. 2006) (noting that, in Virginia, IIED “requires four elements to be proved:  
(1) the wrongdoer’s conduct was intentional or reckless; (2) the conduct was outrageous 
and intolerable; (3) there was a causal connection between the wrongdoer’s conduct and 
the emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress was severe”). 
 4 See Ex parte Bole, 103 So. 3d 40, 52 (Ala. 2012) (remarking that “[t]he intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress is also known as the tort of outrage”). 
 5 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that 
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .”  
U.S. CONST. amend. I.  The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses were incorporated nearly 
ninety years ago through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause as fundamen-
tal liberties, rendering them applicable to state and local government entities and offi-
cials.  See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (establishing freedom of speech 
and freedom of the press as “fundamental personal rights . . . protected by the due pro-
cess clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States”). 
 6 See Michael I. Krauss, A Marine’s Honor:  The Supreme Court from Snyder to Alvarez, 20 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 1, 13 (2012) (noting that “the plaintiff in Snyder was a private citizen”); Na-
than B. Oman & Jason M. Solomon, The Supreme Court’s Theory of Private Law, 62 DUKE L.J. 
1109, 1168 (2013) (characterizing Snyder as “a case involving a private citizen using pri-
vate law to seek redress against a group of people who sought to hijack his son’s funeral 
for their own purposes”). 
 7 See Snyder, 131 S. Ct.  at 1220 (concluding “that the First Amendment bars [plaintiff Al-
bert] Snyder from recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress”). 
 8 Nat Stern, Secondary Speech and the Protective Approach to Interpretive Dualities in the Roberts 
Court, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 133, 142 (2013). 
 9 Elizabeth M. Jaffe, Sticks and Stones May Break My Bones but Extreme and Outrageous Conduct 
Will Never Hurt Me:  The Demise of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims in the Af-
termath of Snyder v. Phelps, 57 WAYNE L. REV. 473, 475 (2011). 
 10 Other scholars are in accord with Jaffe’s view.  See, e.g., Joseph Russomanno, “Freedom for 
the Thought that We Hate”:  Why Westboro Had to Win, 17 COMM. L. & POL’Y 133, 171 (2012) 
(“After Snyder, intentional infliction of emotional distress is weaker—and perhaps disa-
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sky, in turn, predicted one year later that Snyder was “likely to be an 
unmitigated boon to media defendants litigating tort cases in years to 
come.”11 
Why might such early prognostications ultimately prove to be 
true?  Because, as Professor Mark Tushnet recently wrote, Snyder can 
be interpreted as adopting “a rule that a victim cannot recover for a 
speaker’s intentional infliction of emotional distress if the vehicle for 
inflicting that distress is a comment on a matter of public concern.”12  
He is not the only academic to subscribe to this view.  Professor Eu-
gene Volokh concurs, asserting that Snyder held that IIED “may not 
be used to impose liability based on the distress caused by the content 
of speech on matters of public concern.”13  More generally and broad-
ly, Snyder reaffirmed the First Amendment principle, as Dean Erwin 
Chemerinsky notes, that “speech cannot be punished, or speakers 
held liable, just because the speech is offensive, even deeply offen-
sive.”14 
Now, three years after Snyder, this Article examines how the case is 
affecting the dialectic in media-defendant cases between, on the one 
hand, constitutional concerns with protecting speech regarding mat-
ters of public concern and, on the other hand, tort interests in com-
pensating individuals for severe emotional distress caused by the “ex-
treme and outrageous”15 speech upon which the “parasitic tort”16 of 
 
bled—in claims stemming from speech.  First Amendment protection is now stronger.  
The circumstances under which an intentional infliction claim could prevail have nar-
rowed.”). 
 11 Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Not a Free Press Court?, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1819, 1825 (2012) (cita-
tion omitted). 
 12 Mark Tushnet, The First Amendment and Political Risk, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 103, 109 (2012). 
 13 Eugene Volokh, The Trouble With “Public Discourse” as a Limitation on Free Speech Rights, 97 
VA. L. REV. 567, 585 (2011). 
 14 Erwin Chemerinsky, Not a Free Speech Court, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 723, 724 (2011); see Lidsky, 
supra note 11, at 1821–22 (observing that Snyder, along with the Court’s ruling in the im-
ages-of-animal-cruelty case of United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010), “affirm[s] 
that the government may not suppress distasteful speech, even when most citizens find it 
morally reprehensible and it offers little social value”). 
 15 See, e.g., Stokes v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., 599 F.3d 617, 626 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that, un-
der the first element of IIED, a plaintiff must demonstrate that “the defendant’s conduct 
was truly extreme and outrageous”); Hunt v. Delaware, 69 A.3d 360, 367 (Del. 2013) (not-
ing that a plaintiff must prove that the defendant “engaged in extreme or outrageous 
conduct”); Phung v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 644 N.E.2d 286, 289 (Ohio 1994) (noting that a 
plaintiff suing for IIED must prove “that the defendant’s conduct was extreme and outra-
geous”). 
 16 See, e.g., Woodrow Hartzog, Promises and Privacy:  Promissory Estoppel and Confidential Disclo-
sure in Online Communities, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 891, 904 (2009) (describing IIED as “a para-
sitic tort with more academic hullabaloo than real-world success” (quoting Patricia 
Sanchez Abril, A (My)Space of One’s Own:  On Privacy and Online Social Networks, 6 NW. J. 
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IIED pivots.  Much important scholarly ink has been expended in re-
cent years considering the meaning of public concern and its close 
cousin, newsworthiness,17 within the context of privacy and, specifical-
ly, the tort of public disclosure of private facts.18  This Article, instead, 
starts to break new ground by concentrating on the meaning of pub-
lic concern within the context of IIED and, in particular, IIED claims 
based upon the publication of allegedly outrageous speech by media 
defendants that were resolved after Snyder. 
Initially, Part I provides a primer on Snyder, as well as both the Su-
preme Court’s 1988 ruling in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell19 and the 
critical IIED element demanding proof that a defendant engaged in 
extreme and outrageous conduct or speech.20  Part II then analyzes 
and critiques four post-Snyder cases involving IIED claims filed against 
media defendants and premised upon the publication of allegedly 
outrageous speech.21  Specifically, Part II investigates how notions of 
public concern and/or outrageous speech in this quartet of disputes 
played out in comparison to, and against the backdrop of, Snyder. 
Returning to address in greater detail the most recent of the four 
cases analyzed in Part II—namely, Rodriguez v. Fox News Network, 
LLC,22 which now is on appeal—the Article in Parts III23 and IV24 ex-
 
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 73, 81 (2007))); Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Defense Against Out-
rage and the Perils of Parasitic Torts, 45 GA. L. REV. 107, 115–16 (2010) (“In practice, if not 
in doctrine, IIED continues to be a parasitic tort, one that is pled and alleged in circum-
stances where other, better-established tort or contract claims could also have been put 
forward.”). 
 17 See, e.g., Mary-Rose Papandrea, Citizen Journalism and the Reporter’s Privilege, 91 MINN. L. 
REV. 515, 580–81 (2007) (“A newsworthiness standard . . . involves essentially the same 
inquiry as a ‘public concern’ test.  A newsworthiness inquiry is common in the context of 
privacy tort actions.”). 
 18 See, e.g., Patricia Sanchez Abril, “A Simple, Human Measure of Privacy”:  Public Disclosure of 
Private Facts in the World of Tiger Woods, 10 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 385, 385–86 (2011) (dis-
cussing “the applicability of the public disclosure tort” and appealing “for reinvigorated 
privacy protection for those who shield their private lives”); Samantha Barbas, The Death of 
the Public Disclosure Tort:  A Historical Perspective, 22 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 171, 172 (2010) 
(noting scholars generally regard the tort of public disclosure of private facts as dead); 
Amy Gajda, Judging Journalism:  The Turn Toward Privacy and Judicial Regulation of the Press, 
97 CALIF. L. REV. 1039, 1040 (2009) (noting that “tort law provides remedies against even 
accurate reporting when it invades personal privacy”); Richard T. Karcher, Tort Law and 
Journalism Ethics, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 781, 781 (2009) (endeavoring to “compare[] and 
contrast[] the ethical obligations of news reporters under journalism ethics codes with 
their reporting obligations under state defamation and privacy tort laws”). 
 19 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
 20 See infra notes 26–76 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 77–209 and accompanying text. 
 22 Minute Entry, Rodriguez v. Fox News Network LLC, No. CV2013-008467 (Ariz. Super. Ct. 
Jan. 30, 2014) [hereinafter Rodriguez Minute Entry], available at 
http://www.medialaw.org/images/medialawdaily/rodriguezminute.pdf. 
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plores how increasing judicial and legislative sensitivity to the emo-
tional impact of images of death on relatives, along with news media 
awareness that coverage of car chases could very well end with the 
capture of such death images, might affect IIED cases akin to Rodri-
guez in the future.  Finally, this Article concludes by asserting that the 
cases evaluated here largely demonstrate the elasticity of the public 
concern concept in IIED cases after Snyder and, in turn, lower courts’ 
seeming unwillingness to confine the holding in Snyder to its unique 
set of facts.25  With the exception of one decision, the cases represent 
clear First Amendment victories for media defendants, much as many 
predicted would be the situation after Snyder.  Importantly, the con-
clusion of this Article also considers several ways in which Snyder 
might be limited in the future and it rejects one such method as con-
stitutionally unsound. 
I.  SNYDER V. PHELPS, MATTERS OF PUBLIC CONCERN AND EXTREME AND 
OUTRAGEOUS CONDUCT:  A PRIMER 
Snyder v. Phelps26 centered on speech by seven members of the 
Westboro Baptist Church (“WBC”).27  They were standing on public 
property about 1,000 feet away from a church where a funeral was be-
ing held for Matthew Snyder, a soldier killed in the line of duty in 
Iraq.28  Believing “that the United States is overly tolerant of sin and 
that God kills American soldiers as punishment[,]”29 the WBC mem-
bers held signs with messages such as “Thank God for IEDs,” “God 
Hates Fags,” and “Pope in Hell[.]”30  They displayed them “for about 
30 minutes before the funeral began and sang hymns and recited Bi-
ble verses.”31 
Albert Snyder, the deceased soldier’s father, sued for IIED, among 
other causes of action.32  When the case reached the U.S. Supreme 
Court, Chief Justice John Roberts observed for the eight-Justice ma-
jority that the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment “can serve 
 
 23 See infra notes 210–38 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 239–52 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 253–77 and accompanying text. 
 26 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). 
 27 Id. at 1213. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
 32 See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1214 (2011) (noting that Albert Snyder “alleged five 
state tort law claims:  defamation, publicity given to private life, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, intrusion upon seclusion, and civil conspiracy.”). 
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as a defense in state tort suits, including suits for intentional infliction 
of emotional distress.”33  Chief Justice Roberts reasoned that any lia-
bility for IIED in Snyder hinged “largely on whether [the WBC’s] 
speech is of public or private concern,”34 with speech regarding mat-
ters of public concern being privileged and “at the heart of the First 
Amendment’s protection.”35 
In explicating public concern, the Snyder majority focused on 
three variables—content, context, and form of the speech36—and 
wrote that when considering them, “no factor is dispositive, and it is 
necessary to evaluate all the circumstances of the speech, including 
what was said, where it was said, and how it was said.”37  In addition to 
articulating this trio of variables, the Court broadly defined public 
concern as expression that might “be fairly considered as relating to 
any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community”38 
or that relates to “a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a sub-
ject of general interest and of value and concern to the public[.]”39  
This disjunctive, two-part test (the Court used “or”40 rather than “and” 
to separate the prongs) has been criticized as “riddled with ambigui-
ties that lower courts must now sort through.”41 
In Snyder, however, the majority had little problem in finding the 
WBC’s speech related to matters of public concern.  Chief Justice 
Roberts, for instance, wrote that the signs’ content “plainly relates to 
broad issues of interest to society at large,”42 namely “the political and 
moral conduct of the United States and its citizens, the fate of our 
Nation, homosexuality in the military, and scandals involving the 
Catholic clergy.”43  In terms of the context in which that speech oc-
curred, Chief Justice Roberts found that the “signs, displayed on pub-
lic land next to a public street, reflect the fact that the church finds 
much to condemn in modern society.”44  In particular, the purposeful 
 
 33 Id. at 1215. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758–59 
(1985) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978))). 
 36 Id. at 1216. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1216 (2011) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 
146 (1983)). 
 39 Id. (quoting City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83–84 (2004)). 
 40 Id. 
 41 Clay Calvert, Defining “Public Concern” After Snyder v. Phelps:  A Pliable Standard Mingles 
With News Media Complicity, 19 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 39, 70 (2012). 
 42 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1216. 
 43 Id. at 1217. 
 44 Id. 
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context of protesting at military funerals illustrated the public nature 
of the speech “because Westboro believes that God is killing Ameri-
can soldiers as punishment for the Nation’s sinful policies.”45 
Although Chief Justice Roberts emphasized that the majority’s de-
cision in favor of the WBC was narrow and “limited by the particular 
facts before us[,]”46 he closed with a very broad rhetorical flourish47 
about the importance of protecting hateful and hurtful speech: 
Speech is powerful.  It can stir people to action, move them to tears of 
both joy and sorrow, and—as it did here—inflict great pain.  On the facts 
before us, we cannot react to that pain by punishing the speaker.  As a 
Nation we have chosen a different course—to protect even hurtful 
speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate.48 
Snyder came more than two decades after the Supreme Court’s 
1988 decision in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell.49  Falwell first consti-
tutionalized IIED in speech-based cases involving matters of public 
concern50 by requiring public officials and public figures to prove, in 
addition to the common-law IIED elements, “that the publication 
contains a false statement of fact which was made with ‘actual malice,’ 
i.e., with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless dis-
regard as to whether or not it was true.”51  In doing so, the Court 
ruled against public-figure plaintiff Jerry Falwell’s efforts to recover 
for the emotional distress the reverend and Moral Majority leader 
sustained due to an ad parody in Hustler suggesting he engaged in “a 
drunken incestuous rendezvous with his mother in an outhouse.”52 
In Snyder, the Court went beyond the rule it created in Falwell.  
Specifically, the majority suggested that even when an IIED plaintiff is 
a private figure, as was Albert Snyder,53 the First Amendment does not 
permit recovery for IIED damages when the speech involves an opin-
 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. at 1220. 
 47 One commentator has dubbed Chief Justice Roberts’ concluding words in Snyder “a 
breathtaking piece of rhetoric.” Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Judging Pain, 31 QUINNIPIAC L. 
REV. 233, 245 (2013). 
 48 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1220. 
 49 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
 50 The Court emphasized in Falwell that “[a]t the heart of the First Amendment is the 
recognition of the fundamental importance of the free flow of ideas and opinions on 
matters of public interest and concern.” Id. at 50. 
 51 Id. at 56. 
 52 Id. at 48. 
 53 See Mark Strasser, Funeral Protests, Privacy, and the Constitution:  What is Next After Phelps?, 
61 AM. U. L. REV. 279, 299 (2011) (noting that plaintiff Albert Snyder “does not qualify as 
a public figure” and adding that “Falwell is distinguishable from [Snyder] in that the for-
mer involved a public figure”). 
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ion on a matter of public concern.54  The Snyder Court, as Professor 
Cristina Carmody Tilley writes, “failed to apply even the minimally 
tort-protective standard it had announced in Falwell, where the actual 
malice test was imported to IIED claims.”55  In a nutshell, “the Court 
concluded that the First Amendment trumped the IIED tort 
claim . . . because Westboro’s speech related to matters of import to 
society at large.”56 
Why did the Court take these First Amendment-protective actions 
in Falwell and Snyder?  In both cases, it was particularly concerned 
about providing a constitutional check against the subjectivity of the 
common-law IIED element that requires a plaintiff to prove a de-
fendant’s conduct (or speech, as in the cases here) is extreme and 
outrageous.57  In Falwell, for instance, the Court reasoned: 
“Outrageousness” in the area of political and social discourse has an in-
herent subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to impose liability 
on the basis of the jurors’ tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of their 
dislike of a particular expression.  An “outrageousness” standard thus 
runs afoul of our longstanding refusal to allow damages to be awarded 
because the speech in question may have an adverse emotional impact 
on the audience.58 
More than twenty years later, in Snyder, the Court criticized outra-
geousness as “a highly malleable standard” that creates “a risk [that] 
is unacceptable” in terms of speech being punished simply because it 
is offensive or insulting to the tastes and views of jurors.59  The Court 
thus reasoned that the WBC’s speech on matters of public concern 
was “entitled to ‘special protection’ under the First Amendment, and 
that protection cannot be overcome by a jury finding that the picket-
ing was outrageous.”60 
 
 54 As Professor Frederick Schauer summarizes the Court’s holding in Snyder, 
the Supreme Court invalidated the $5 million damage award, primarily because 
the picketing was related to a matter of public concern.  Because of this, the Court 
held, the First Amendment prevented Maryland from applying the common law of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress to the conduct of Phelps and the 
Westboro Baptist Church.   
Frederick Schauer, Constitutionalism and Coercion, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1881, 1888 (2013); 
see also Russomanno, supra note 10, at 171 (noting that “Snyder expands protection 
from [IIED] to defendants whose speech is on matters of public concern, regardless 
of the plaintiffs public/private status”). 
 55 Cristina Carmody Tilley, Rescuing Dignitary Torts from the Constitution, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 
65, 74 (2012). 
 56 Douglas Behrens, Balancing Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims and First 
Amendment Protections in Snyder v. Phelps, 11 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 213, 221 
(2013). 
 57 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 58 Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988). 
 59 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011). 
 60 Id. 
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How, then, is outrageous conduct defined?  The extreme-and-
outrageous conduct or speech element of IIED sometimes is de-
scribed by courts as conduct that is “atrocious and utterly intolerable 
in a civilized society.”61  It also represents conduct that is “so extreme 
as to exceed all bounds of decency in a civilized community.”62  As the 
Supreme Court of Oklahoma neatly summed it up in 2011, this ele-
ment “requires the existence of conduct so extreme in degree as to 
go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and which is viewed as 
atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community”63 and that, 
“[i]n general, a defendant’s conduct must be such that an average 
member of the community would exclaim, ‘Outrageous!’”64  Whether 
or not the conduct in question amounts to such “an extraordinary 
transgression is a fact-specific inquiry, to be considered on a case-by-
case basis, based on the totality of the circumstances.”65 
Conversely, as the Supreme Court of Nebraska recently wrote in 
paraphrasing the observations of the drafters of the Restatement (Se-
cond) of Torts,66 “[m]ere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty 
oppressions, or other trivialities that result from living in society do 
not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct.”67  The Su-
preme Court of Kentucky added that “[i]t must be more than bad 
manners[.]”68  The Supreme Court of Kansas, in turn, concisely syn-
thesized what does and does not amount to extreme and outrageous 
conduct, writing in 2010, 
[c]onduct that rises to the level of tortious outrage must transcend a cer-
tain amount of criticism, rough language, and occasional acts and words 
that are inconsiderate and unkind.  The law will not intervene where 
someone’s feelings merely are hurt.  In order to provide a sufficient basis 
for an action to recover for emotional distress, conduct must be outra-
geous to the point that it goes beyond the bounds of decency and is ut-
terly intolerable in a civilized society.69 
 
 61 S.B. v. St. James Sch., 959 So. 2d 72, 93 (Ala. 2006) (quoting Travelers Indem. Co. of Ill. v. 
Griner, 809 So. 2d 808, 810 (Ala. 2011)). 
 62 Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood Apartments, 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 453, 486 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2009). 
 63 Durham v. McDonald’s Rests. of Okla., Inc., 256 P.3d 64, 67 n.1 (Okla. 2011) (citing 
Kraszewski v. Baptist Med. Ctr. of Okla., Inc., 916 P.2d 241, 248 n.25 (Okla. 1996)). 
 64 Id. (quoting Computer Publ’ns, Inc. v. Welton, 49 P.3d 732, 735 (Okla. 2002). 
 65 House v. Hicks, 179 P.3d 730, 736 (Or. Ct. App. 2008). 
 66 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d. (1965) (“The liability clearly does not 
extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivi-
alities.”). 
 67 Roth v. Wiese, 716 N.W.2d 419, 432 (Neb. 2006). 
 68 Childers v. Geile, 367 S.W.3d 576, 581 (Ky. 2012). 
 69 Valadez v. Emmis Comm., 229 P.3d 389, 394 (Kan. 2010). 
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Despite such judicial efforts to clarify what constitutes extreme 
and outrageous conduct, the determination of outrageousness is still 
subjective.  As this Author waggishly asserted elsewhere, 
[i]f Kevin Pollak’s character in A Few Good Men, Lt. Sam Weinberg, was 
correct when he said that a fence line is a big wall that separates the good 
guys from the bad guys, then outrageousness in IIED represents the most 
shoddy variety of fence line:  Its porousness and permeability prevent 
predicting whether certain speech is actionable.70 
Procedurally, it is first up to a judge to determine if the conduct 
or speech in question can possibly be considered extreme and outra-
geous.71  If a judge finds that it can be, then it is up to the jury to de-
cide whether, in fact, it is extreme and outrageous.72 
In summary, after Snyder, there is now a direct tension between 
the constitutional interest in safeguarding expression affecting mat-
ters of public concern and the common-law tort interest in protecting 
citizens against extreme and outrageous behavior.  A finding of the 
former, constitutional element by a court or jury is designed to keep 
in check a simultaneous finding of the latter, common-law element.  
Put more bluntly, the strain today is between speech about matters of 
public concern and speech that is outrageous.  How is that friction 
playing out after Snyder?  As the four post-Snyder cases described in 
Part II indicate, both concepts—public concern and outrageous-
ness—have so much elasticity that the current state of the law is 
bound to produce inconsistent results and, in turn, shoddy doctrinal 
development. 
This probably is not surprising.  As Professor David Ardia wrote in 
the aftermath of Snyder, “much work remains to be done in formulat-
ing a consistent approach to divining this line” between speech about 
matters of public and private concern.73  And in reference to the 
Snyder dichotomy between public concern and private matters, Pro-
fessor Steven Heyman adds that, in some cases, “the use of these ab-
stract categories is simply too crude a tool to allow for a thoughtful 
consideration of the values at stake.”74 
 
 70 Clay Calvert, Tort Transformation in the Cultural Quicksand of Language and Values, 39 LITIG. 
30, 34 (2013). 
 71 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 66, at § 46 cmt. h (“It is for the court to 
determine, in the first instance, whether the defendant’s conduct may reasonably be re-
garded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery . . . .”). 
 72 See Hunt v. Delaware, 69 A.3d 360, 367 (Del. 2013) (“If reasonable minds may differ, the 
question of whether the conduct is extreme and outrageous is for the jury.”). 
 73 David S. Ardia, Freedom of Speech, Defamation, and Injunctions, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 75 
(2013). 
 74 Steven J. Heyman, To Drink the Cup of Fury:  Funeral Picketing, Public Discourse, and the First 
Amendment, 45 CONN. L. REV. 101, 126 (2012). 
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Of course, courts today are under no obligation to rip Snyder from 
its rather quirky factual moorings and extend its public con-
cern/private concern dichotomy to other IIED scenarios.  That is be-
cause, as noted above, the Snyder majority wrote that its decision was 
narrowly confined to the facts of the case.75  In fact, Professor Deana 
Pollard Sacks argued in 2012 that Snyder is “specifically limited to its 
extraordinary facts.”76  Additionally, courts could well interpret the 
concept of public concern narrowly, so as to apply it only to opinions 
and viewpoints—not to factual assertions—relevant to public debate 
about issues affecting a democratic society, such as those on gay 
rights and sexual abuse by the clergy in Snyder. 
With this in mind, the Article now turns to an analysis of four post-
Snyder, media-defendant cases that illustrate the continuing elusive-
ness and ambiguousness of both public concern and outrageous 
conduct. 
II.  PUBLIC CONCERN AND OUTRAGEOUS SPEECH:  TESTING THE LEGAL 
BOUNDARIES AFTER SNYDER IN A QUARTET OF MEDIA-DEFENDANT IIED 
CASES 
Each of the four cases examined below involves an IIED claim 
filed against a media defendant and based upon the publication of 
allegedly outrageous speech, rather than supposedly outrageous 
newsgathering methods.77  The cases are analyzed in chronological 
order, starting with the most recent and proceeding to the oldest.  
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Snyder v. Phelps was cited by ei-
ther the media defendants and/or the courts in all four cases. 
 
 75 See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 76 Deana Pollard Sacks, Constitutionalized Negligence, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 1065, 1068 (2012). 
 77 Intentional infliction of emotional distress claims against news media organizations may 
be premised upon how the news or information in question was gathered, as compared to 
how it was reported.  See, e.g., Conradt v. NBC Universal, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 2d 380, 383 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“[Plaintiff’s] principal claims survive, for . . . a reasonable jury could find 
that NBC crossed the line from responsible journalism to irresponsible and reckless in-
trusion into law enforcement. . . . NBC purportedly instigated and then placed itself 
squarely in the middle of a police operation, pushing the police to engage in tactics that 
were unnecessary and unwise, solely to generate more dramatic footage for a television 
show.”); KOVR-TV, Inc. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 431, 435 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) 
(concluding that a reasonable jury could find that the manner in which a never-broadcast 
interview was conducted by a television news reporter with three minors, who were home 
alone, constituted extreme and outrageous conduct).  Such claims based upon allegedly 
outrageous newsgathering methods are beyond the scope of this Article. 
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The cases were chosen, in part, because they cut across a wide 
and, arguably, controversial variety of topics that test the boundaries 
of public concern and outrageousness, namely: 
 
(1) the live television broadcast of a suicide that was later wit-
nessed by the plaintiffs—the decedent’s three minor children—
on the Internet;78 
 
(2) the admittedly false publication by a well-known and gossip-
prone tabloid of a trio of stories regarding the death and re-
mains of Natalee Holloway;79 
 
(3) the Internet-posting of parts of a hidden-camera sex tape of a 
well-known professional wrestler, Terry Gene Bollea, better 
known as Hulk Hogan;80 and 
 
(4) the broadcast of a woman’s arrest and involuntary appearance 
on a reality television program called Female Forces.81 
A.  Rodriguez v. Fox News Network LLC82 
Fast-forward approximately two-and-a-half years after Snyder to Au-
gust 2013 and the defendant’s motion to dismiss (MTD) the IIED 
claim in Rodriguez v. Fox News Network LLC.83  The commanding rhe-
torical dicta with which Chief Justice Roberts memorably closed his 
Snyder opinion—the verbiage regarding the power of speech and the 
need to protect even hurtful expression84—finds itself quoted early in 
the Rodriguez MTD.85  Snyder, in fact, is cited at multiple points in the 
motion for the following propositions, each of which addresses mat-
ters of public concern: 
 
 78 Infra Part II.A. 
 79 Infra Part II.B. 
 80 Infra Part II.C. 
 81 Infra Part II.D. 
 82 Rodriguez Minute Entry, supra note 22. 
 83 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint, Rodriguez v. News Corp., No. CV2013-008467 
(Ariz. Super. Ct. Aug. 30, 2013) [hereinafter Rodriguez Motion to Dismiss]. 
 84 This refers to the Court’s statement: 
Speech is powerful.  It can stir people to action, move them to tears of both joy 
and sorrow, and—as it did here—inflict great pain.  On the facts before us, we 
cannot react to that pain by punishing the speaker.  As a Nation we have chosen a 
different course—to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we 
do not stifle public debate.   
  Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011). 
 85 Rodriguez Motion to Dismiss, supra note 83, at 3. 
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• “statements about issues of public concern that do not contain 
provably false statements of fact – like the ones here – are abso-
lutely privileged under the First Amendment[;]”86 
 
• “as a matter of well-settled First Amendment and common law, 
Fox cannot be held liable for emotional distress caused by news 
coverage of an issue of public concern[;]”87 
 
• “a plaintiff cannot recover for emotional distress stemming 
from statements addressing an issue of public concern without 
demonstrating that the speech is false, or some other form of 
unprotected expression[;]”88 and 
 
• “the First Amendment’s long-settled protections for speech 
about public officials and public figures apply with equal force 
to speech on issues of public concern in the context of cases alleg-
ing emotional distress.”89 
 
What then, with this heavy reliance upon Snyder, was the alleged 
issue of public concern in Rodriguez?  Did it relate to national security, 
foreign or domestic terrorism, same-sex marriage, credit-card data 
breaches, the national debt, the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act, or the job Barack Obama is doing as President?  Or did it 
pertain, as was the scenario in Snyder, to issues such as American tol-
erance of homosexuality and sexual abuse by members of the clergy? 
No, it related to none of the above.  In fact, the speech that gave 
rise to the IIED claim in Rodriguez was a fleeting, long-distance image 
that was televised live to a national audience on Fox News Channel’s 
Studio B with Shepard Smith on September 28, 2012.90  It was the picture 
of JoDon Romero committing suicide in the Arizona desert after a 
high-speed chase that concluded when Romero pulled off from In-
terstate 10, abandoned his car and ran from it.91  All totaled, about 
 
 86 Id. at 2 (emphasis added). 
 87 Id. at 3 (emphasis added). 
 88 Id. at 5 (emphasis added). 
 89 Id. at 7 (emphasis added). 
 90 See Complaint at 2–4, Rodriguez v. Fox News Network, LLC, No. CV2013-008467, (Ariz. 
Super. Ct. June 6, 2013) [hereinafter Rodriguez Complaint], available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/r/2010-2019/WashingtonPost/2013/06/13/Editorial-
Opinion/Graphics/fox-car-chase-suicide-complaint.pdf (detailing the facts of the case). 
 91 Id. at 3–4. 
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1.8 million viewers “witnessed the death from their couches.”92  Only 
three people, however, who saw it later on the Internet, would pro-
vide the impetus for the Rodriguez lawsuit. 
 
“That didn’t belong on TV.”93 
 
Shepard Smith, in apologizing with those words to his viewing au-
dience shortly after airing Romero’s suicide, may be morally and eth-
ically correct that Romero’s death was inappropriate for television.  
That, however, is a far different matter from whether Fox News 
should be held legally accountable to Romero’s children under the 
IIED tort. 
The Rodriguez complaint, which was filed on behalf of the three 
minor sons of JoDon Romero, contended the trio, who were at school 
when the death aired live on Fox News Channel, saw it later that day 
at home after finding “a clip of the Fox News broadcast on 
YouTube.”94  In a nutshell, the complaint’s IIED cause of action as-
serted that Fox’s decision to air the suicide live constituted extreme 
and outrageous conduct or speech that ultimately caused the minors 
severe emotional distress.95 
Fox News, unsurprisingly, framed the issues of public concern in 
its motion to dismiss as “public safety and law enforcement,”96 not 
Romero’s on-air suicide.  In other words, the defendants focused on 
the police chase of Romero and the danger it posed to the public, 
not the suicide that transpired after the vehicular chase ended.  Cit-
ing Snyder, Fox asserted that “a live news program that informed the 
public about an ongoing police pursuit of an armed and ‘extremely 
dangerous’ suspect cannot form the basis of a claim for emotional 
distress where the Complaint fails to allege the Newscast was false in 
any way.”97 
On January 30, 2014, Maricopa County Superior Court Judge 
John Rea, immediately after hearing oral argument, ruled from the 
bench in favor of Fox News and dismissed the IIED claim.98  Among 
 
 92 Don Kaplan et al., Fox News Horror, DAILY NEWS, Sept. 29, 2012, at 4. 
 93 Brian Stelter, Fox Regrets Suicide Shown Live, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2012, at A16 (quoting 
Shepard Smith’s on-air comment after his program aired the suicide of JoDon Romero) 
(emphasis added). 
 94 Rodriguez Complaint, supra note 90, at  4. 
 95 Id. at 6. 
 96 Rodriguez Motion to Dismiss, supra note 83, at 6. 
 97 Id. at 8. 
 98 See E-mail from Joel B. Robbins, Esq., Robbins & Curtin, PLLC, to author (Jan. 31, 2014, 
11:19 EST) (on file with author) (stating that the judge “ruled from the bench that the 
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other reasons that can be heard from an audio recording of the hear-
ing, Judge Rea: a) cited First Amendment concerns; b) found the 
events were newsworthy and did not stop being newsworthy simply 
because they culminated in a suicide; and c) held that Fox’s actions 
were not extreme and outrageous, as required under the basic ele-
ments of IIED.99 
Fox News’s successful and frequent use of Snyder in its Rodriguez 
motion to dismiss initially suggests that both Professors Jaffe100 and 
Lidsky,101 who are quoted at the start of this Article, may be correct in 
predicting the long-term, pro-defendant impact of Snyder on IIED 
claims brought by private figures.  The Rodriguez IIED claim also was 
plagued by the question of causation, with Fox News emphasizing in 
its motion to dismiss that the children did not watch the Fox News 
broadcast of the suicide but, rather, saw it only later on YouTube.102  
As Fox asserted, “whatever emotional injuries they suffered were not a 
direct and proximate result of the Newscast.  Rather (and rather can-
didly), they were the result of (a) their father’s lawless conduct, and 
(b) their mother’s apparent failure to control their access to the In-
ternet.”103 
Regardless of these seemingly clear flaws with the plaintiffs’ IIED 
case, the underlying facts of Rodriguez make it an excellent vehicle for 
considering the metes and bounds of public concern and outra-
geousness post Snyder.  Furthermore, the case is still very much alive, 
as the plaintiffs’ attorney, Joel Robbins, vowed to appeal it, asserting 
that “[t]he First Amendment has some limitations.”104 
Consider, for example, the factors of “context” and “content” 
spelled out by the Snyder majority in determining whether speech is a 
matter of public concern.105  The speech at issue in Snyder occurred in 
 
motion to dismiss was granted for [F]irst [A]mendment reasons, and that [his] IIED 
failed because it wasn’t outrageous”). 
 99 Audio Recording of Motion to Dismiss Hearing, Rodriguez v. Fox News Network, LLC, 
Jan. 30, 2014 (on file with author). 
100 Jaffe, supra note 9. 
101 Lidsky, supra note 11. 
102 See Rodriguez Motion to Dismiss, supra note 83, at 10 (“The Complaint concedes that 
Plaintiff’s children were in school and did not watch the Fox Newscast.  Instead, they 
learned of the incident at school and later that day watched a  video clip of  the incident 
on YouTube.”). 
103 Id. 
104 Jacques Billeaud, Arizona Judge Tosses Suit Against Fox News Network, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 14, 
2014, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/feb/14/ariz-judge-tosses-
suit-against-fox-news-network/ (quoting Robbins). 
105 See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text. 
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the context of what the Court called “public debate,”106 specifically in-
volving “picketing”107 and “protest”108 in the geographical context of a 
“traditional public forum”109 and during which the WBC “convey[ed] 
its views”110 on content relating “to broad issues of interest to society 
at large.”111 
Was, one might reasonably wonder, Fox News really engaged in 
“public debate”112—a key phrase used by Chief Justice Roberts in the 
same Snyder dicta quoted approvingly by Fox News in Rodriguez—
when it aired the suicide?  What “public debate,” one might query, 
would be stifled were tort liability to be imposed in Rodriguez?  Fox 
News and Shepard Smith were not, in fact, debating the pros and 
cons of high-speed police car chases on public freeways.  Further-
more, they were not debating anything to do with suicide. 
Instead, Fox was merely casting a camera on the world to capture 
facts as they unfolded in unscripted fashion, with Shepard Smith play-
ing the role of narrator.  Unlike the members of the WBC, Fox News 
was not expressing its viewpoints or opinions on any broad issues of 
interest to society at large, but simply was seizing images of events as 
they transpired in real-time fashion and merely providing a verbal 
narration to supplement the transmission of instantaneous images. 
Snyder, in brief, dealt with the expression of viewpoints and opin-
ions in the form of words.  Rodriguez deals largely with the expression 
of facts in the form of images.  Although Judge Rea failed to make 
this distinction between assertions of opinion (Snyder) and assertions 
of fact (Rodriguez), the federal magistrate in Holloway v. American Me-
dia, Inc.113 (described in the next Subpart) recognized this fundamen-
tal difference in 2013, and it played a pivotal part in the outcome of 
that case, which allowed an IIED claim to continue in the face of a 
Snyder-based, public-concern defense.114 
 
106 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011). 
107 Id. at 1218. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
110 Id. at 1217. 
111 Id. at 1216. 
112 This refers to the Court’s statement: 
Speech is powerful.  It can stir people to action, move them to tears of both joy 
and sorrow, and—as it did here—inflict great pain.  On the facts before us, we 
cannot react to that pain by punishing the speaker.  As a Nation we have chosen a 
different course—to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we 
do not stifle public debate.   
  Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011) (emphasis added). 
113 947 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1263 (N.D. Ala. 2013) (recognizing the difference between asser-
tions of opinion and assertions of fact). 
114 See infra Part II.B. 
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Furthermore, in Snyder, the Supreme Court wrote that “the issues 
[the WBC members] highlight—the political and moral conduct of 
the United States and its citizens, the fate of our Nation, homosexual-
ity in the military, and scandals involving the Catholic clergy—are 
matters of public import.”115  It is a long stretch to claim that a car 
chase of a lone, previously unknown individual is equivalent to such 
matters of public import in Snyder, let alone whether the image of the 
suicide of a single individual in the Arizona desert is a matter of pub-
lic import.  What this illustrates, of course, is the vastly expansive and 
almost unrestrained nature of the concept of public concern upon 
which the Snyder majority rested its decision.  Even if one assumes 
that a car chase is matter of public concern because innocent people 
might be injured by it and because it illustrates law enforcement offi-
cials performing their important and dangerous public duties, one 
might reasonably wonder whether this matter of public concern ter-
minates when the car chase itself ends and the suspect pulls out a gun 
to shoot himself. 
If Snyder’s determination that private figures must pay an emo-
tional price for speech about matters of public concern represents, as 
Professor Ronald Krotoszynski aptly puts it, “a major displacement of 
traditional state tort law to accommodate . . . debate about public af-
fairs[,]”116 then Snyder does not necessarily extend to a factual situa-
tion (as opposed to a situation involving the expression of opinions) 
where the plaintiffs are minors.  This would be a far different scenar-
io from Snyder’s facts, because Snyder involved an adult-father plaintiff.  
Additionally, in Rodriguez, the factual images of the suicide of the 
children’s father did not affect any debate about public affairs. 
Is live coverage of car chases by law enforcement personnel truly a 
matter of public concern?  Assuming for the sake of argument that it 
is a matter of public concern, then is continuing, post-chase coverage—
after the car chase ends, after the vehicle is no longer on a public 
road or highway where it might collide with other vehicles and when 
its driver is no longer near any other members of the public so as to 
endanger their safety—a matter of public concern?  And, going yet 
another step further, is an image of a desperate man—a man who 
almost certainly will not escape capture because law enforcement 
personnel are on the scene—killing himself a matter of public con-
cern akin to the viewpoints that animated Snyder? 
 
115 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1217. 
116 Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Polysemy of Privacy, 88 IND. L.J. 881, 902 (2013). 
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All of these are questions that could easily be put to a jury if, in 
accord with Chief Justice John Roberts’ own words in Snyder, the 
Court’s opinion in that case is limited by its particular facts.117  Fur-
thermore, unlike the public-figure plaintiff in Falwell, the plaintiffs in 
Rodriguez—three minors—are private figures, rendering a Falwell-
based defense distinguishable and impossible to raise in Rodriguez.  
The rule from Falwell thus does not apply, and all that a court like 
that in Rodriguez then is left with is Snyder and the choice of whether 
to stretch Snyder beyond its factual confines to a very different con-
text.  Judge Rea chose to extend it, and his decision illustrates the 
vast elasticity of public concern in IIED cases involving private-figure 
plaintiffs. 
The flipside of the public concern question is whether, under the 
common-law IIED elements, the conduct of Fox News was extreme 
and outrageous.118  The answer likely depends upon how one parses 
and splices the conduct.  Airing a car chase on a newscast is likely not 
extreme and outrageous conduct; in fact, it seems routine today, ra-
ther than beyond the bounds of decency in a civilized society.119  Con-
versely, airing a suicide live on national television might well be con-
sidered extreme and outrageous conduct today, especially if, as Part 
III suggests, it is reasonably foreseeable that resulting suicide images 
will quickly migrate to the Internet where they likely will exist in per-
petuity. 
Another way to parse the extreme-and-outrageous conduct issue—
one that an inventive plaintiff’s attorney might assert—is that it was 
extreme and outrageous for Fox not to properly use a tape-delay 
mechanism that would have allowed it to stop coverage prior to the 
suicide.  When a human being fails to timely push the button in or-
der to dump out of the live coverage, as apparently happened in Ro-
driguez,120 and a suicide of no newsworthy value then is shown live, why 
not impose tort liability to deter it from happening again?121  If, as 
 
117 See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
118 See supra notes 61–70 and accompanying text (describing and defining the concept of 
extreme and outrageous conduct as that term is used in the IIED tort). 
119 See infra Part IV. 
120 See Al Tompkins, Will TV’s Long Love Affair With Car Chases Come to a Screeching Halt as Fox 
Broadcasts Suicide Live?, POYNTER (Sept. 30, 2012, 7:46 AM), http://www.poynter.org/
latest-news/als-morning-meeting/189989/will-tvs-long-love-affair-with-car-chases-come-to-
a-screeching-halt-as-fox-broadcasts-suicide-live (“Executive Vice President for News Mi-
chael Clemente tried to explain how it happened.  He called it a ‘severe human error.’  
True enough.  The network put the live feed on a five-second delay, but even that precau-
tion depends on humans hitting a button to ‘dump’ out of the broadcast”). 
121 Professor Andrew Popper writes that: 
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First Amendment expert Randall P. Bezanson asserts, “a central pur-
pose of tort law is to deter and shape harmful behavior,”122 then im-
posing monetary damages for such shoddy conduct would likely lead 
in the future to better training among employees about how to 
properly operate a tape-delay mechanism, so as not to allow it to 
happen again.  A little legal deterrent—or, when parsed more dan-
gerously from the typical media defendant’s parade-of-horribles per-
spective, a little chilling effect—might not always be such a bad thing, 
especially if it improves the skills of those tasked with television news 
coverage.  Al Tompkins of the Poynter Institute writes that Fox News 
also had other options: “Not to air the chase at all.  Or Fox could 
have recorded the footage and waited until the chase ended to air 
portions of it.”123 
Ultimately, Fox News Channel’s heavy reliance in its MTD on 
Snyder and its focus on matters of public concern124 seemed to pay off 
handsomely before Judge Rea, who dismissed the case immediately 
after hearing oral argument.125  Whether this holds up on the now-
pending appeal in Rodriguez remains to be seen. 
B.  Holloway v. American Media, Inc.126 
In May 2013, a federal district court in Alabama refused to dismiss 
an IIED claim filed against the publisher of the National Enquirer by 
Elizabeth Ann Holloway, mother of Natalee Holloway, who disap-
peared in 2005 in Aruba.127  Natalee Holloway’s disappearance pene-
trated deep into popular culture and public consciousness, even 
spawning a highly watched made-for-television movie on the Lifetime 
Channel and causing Nancy Grace’s TV career to soar.128  But it was 
 
the tort system is fully defensible as a primary deterrent mechanism.  It is not a 
perfect system.  Not every case deters.  In the aggregate, however, the civil justice 
system provides a powerful and continuous messaging device that positively affects 
the safety and efficiency of goods and services. 
  Andrew F. Popper, In Defense of Deterrence, 75 ALB. L. REV. 181, 185 (2011/12). 
122 Randall P. Bezanson & Gilbert Cranberg, Institutional Reckless Disregard for Truth in Public 
Defamation Actions Against the Press, 90 IOWA L. REV. 887, 892 (2005). 
123 Tompkins, supra note 120. 
124 See supra notes 86–89 and accompanying text (describing the portions of the Rodriguez 
Motion To Dismiss that reference the concept of public concern and Snyder). 
125 See supra note 98 and accompanying text (discussing the dismissal of the case). 
126 947 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (N.D. Ala. 2013). 
127 See id. at 1271 (“The motion to dismiss and for partial summary judgment is due to be 
DENIED as to the plaintiff’s claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.”). 
128 See Jonathan Storm, Holloway Movie and Mother’s Show are Inexcusable, PHILA. INQUIRER, May 
7, 2011, at D1 (criticizing the treatment of the Natalee Holloway disappearance by the 
Lifetime movie and noting that Nancy Grace’s “career soared on the wings of Natalee’s 
disappearance”); see also Tom Jicha, Grace Before Dinner, SUN SENTINEL, Sept. 12, 2010, 
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the National Enquirer’s publication of at least three articles that 
spawned an IIED claim by Natalee’s mother, who alleged the stories 
were knowingly false and intended to cause her to suffer severe emo-
tional distress.129  Specifically, and as explained by the court, the of-
fending articles 
described a map that purported to show where Natalee’s body was locat-
ed, a “secret graveyard” where Natalee had been “buried alive,” and other 
details about her “murder” and the treatment of her “corpse,” including 
that it had been secreted temporarily in a coffin with another corpse be-
fore being moved to a final location.130 
Elizabeth Ann Holloway, represented by high-profile, plaintiff-
defamation attorney L. Lin Wood,131 claimed “the stories, headlines, 
and photographs published in those three articles caused her to suf-
fer severe emotional stress.”132  The National Enquirer and its owner, 
American Media, countered, among other things, that they were “not 
liable to plaintiff on her tort claims because the published materials 
are ‘of public concern’ and thus are protected by the First Amend-
ment”133 and because “the conduct at issue is not sufficiently ‘outrageous’ 
to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress un-
der Alabama law.”134 
Both concepts at the center of this Article—the First Amendment 
interest in protecting speech about matters of public concern and the 
common law IIED requirement of proving outrageousness—thus 
were squarely before the court in Holloway.  The National Enquirer and 
American Media, represented by the prominent media-defense firm 
of Levine Sullivan Koch & Schulz,135 cited Snyder.  Specifically, they 
 
available at http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2010-09-12/entertainment/fl-arts-nancy-
grace-091210-20100912_1_nancy-grace-cnn-headline-news-casey-anthony  (asserting that 
Nancy Grace “almost single-handedly made Casey Anthony and Natalee Holloway into na-
tional cause celebres”). 
129 Holloway, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1254. 
130 Id. 
131 Wood was “lead civil attorney for the late Richard Jewell in matters arising out of report-
ing about Mr. Jewell in connection with the 1996 bombing of Centennial Olympic Park in 
Atlanta[,]” “attorney for Dr. Phil McGraw in connection with false and defamatory arti-
cles published by Newsweek, the Daily Beast and the National Enquirer[,]” and “lead civil at-
torney for Howard K. Stern in the prosecution and defense of defamation claims arising 
out of the death of Anna Nicole Smith.” L. Lin Wood, WOOD, HERNACKI & EVANS, LLC, 
http://www.whetriallaw.com/Attorneys/L-Lin-Wood.aspx (last visited Oct. 6, 2014). 
132 Holloway, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1254.  
133 Id. (emphasis added). 
134 Id. (emphasis added). 
135 The firm’s “attorneys have been involved in most of the leading media cases in the past 
two decades involving defamation, product disparagement, invasion of privacy, and rights 
of publicity,” and Levine Sullivan Koch & Schulz “has been engaged at one time or an-
other by virtually every major media company and has been appointed by the leading 
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argued that the presence of the former concept (public concern) 
would trump the existence of the latter (outrageousness).  They as-
serted in sweeping fashion that, “regardless of the falsity or outrageousness 
of speech, it is protected by the First Amendment if it involves a mat-
ter ‘of public concern.’”136  The National Enquirer went so far as to 
concede falsity for purposes of its motion to dismiss the IIED cause of 
action, thus arguably pushing Snyder to its outer limits.137  The next 
two Subparts separately analyze how the court in Holloway addressed 
the Snyder/public-concern argument and the question of outra-
geousness. 
1.  Snyder and Matters of Public Concern in Holloway 
Rebuffing the media defendants on their Snyder-based defense, 
U.S. Magistrate T. Michael Putnam decisively put the brakes on an 
expansive interpretation of Snyder, while nonetheless acknowledging 
the National Enquirer’s underlying speech about Natalee Holloway’s 
disappearance was of public concern.138  Putnam initially reined in 
Snyder by suggesting that Snyder’s holding is limited to cases involving 
opinions, not factual assertions, on matters of public concern.  He wrote 
that 
like the “ad parody” in Falwell, the speech at issue in Snyder did not in-
volve asserted “facts,” at least in the sense that a reasonable person could 
understand the offending speech to assert ascertainably “false” state-
ments.  The expressions “God Hates Fags” and “You’re Going to Hell” 
and “Thank God for IEDS” are, at best, opinions, not factual state-
ments.139 
In stark contrast, in Holloway it was “undisputed that the articles at is-
sue purported to describe facts concerning Natalee Holloway’s disap-
pearance.”140 
Second, Magistrate Putnam seized on141 Chief Justice Roberts’ ob-
servation in Snyder that the WBC members honestly believed their 
 
media insurance companies to defend scores of smaller media businesses around the 
country in libel, privacy, and publicity cases.” Defamation, Privacy & Publicity, Practice Areas, 
LEVINE SULLIVAN KOCH & SCHULZ, LLP, http://www.lskslaw.com/practice-areas/
defamation-privacy-publicity (last visited Oct. 6, 2014). 
136 Holloway, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1261 (emphasis added). 
137 Id. at 1262 (“Defendants have definitively stated that, for purposes of their motion, they 
accept the plaintiff’s allegations that the articles were false.”). 
138 Magistrate Putnam opined that “[t]here is little question that the disappearance of Na-
talee Holloway, which dominated news coverage for many weeks, if not years, and which 
involved the safety of travel abroad and called up the worst fears of parents, was a matter 
of ‘concern to the community.’” Id. at 1261 n.10. 
139 Id. at 1261 n.11 (emphasis added). 
140 Id. at 1261 n.9. 
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viewpoints.  “Westboro had been actively engaged in speaking on the 
subjects addressed in its picketing long before it became aware of 
Matthew Snyder, and there can be no serious claim that Westboro’s 
picketing did not represent its ‘honestly believed’ views on public is-
sues[,]” wrote Roberts.142  Magistrate Putnam interpreted this to stand 
for the proposition that “the First Amendment protection described 
in Snyder does not extend to speech that is not ‘honestly’ believed.”143 
Third, Magistrate Putnam opined that Snyder’s First Amendment 
shield does not apply, even when the underlying topic is about a mat-
ter of public concern, if the speech “is used as a weapon simply to 
mount a personal attack against someone over a private matter.”144  
Putnam drew support for this conclusion from Roberts’ twin observa-
tions in Snyder that: 
 
• “We are not concerned in this case that Westboro’s speech on 
public matters was in any way contrived to insulate speech on a 
private matter from liability.”145 
 
• “There was no pre-existing relationship or conflict between 
Westboro and Snyder that might suggest Westboro’s speech on 
public matters was intended to mask an attack on Snyder over a 
private matter.”146 
 
Using these statements in Snyder to distinguish it from the case be-
fore him, Magistrate Putnam noted that Elizabeth Ann Holloway, 
“unlike [the plaintiff in] Snyder, ha[d] alleged that she had a pre-
existing relationship with the defendants and that the newspaper ar-
ticles at issue were ‘intended’ to cause her distress.”147 Ultimately, 
Magistrate Putnam concluded that “Snyder does not definitively ex-
tend First Amendment protection to the speech at issue, because 
plaintiff has alleged that the statements made were not ‘honestly be-
lieved,’ and were motivated by some desire to attack her or cause her 
pain.”148  In his view, “Snyder implies that knowingly false speech moti-
vated by a specific intent to cause emotional harm to a particular per-
 
141 See id. at 1261 (“The Court in Snyder noted, however, that there was no allegation that the 
church members were not representing their ‘honestly believed’ views on public issues.”). 
142 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1217 (2011). 
143 Holloway, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1262. 
144 Id. 
145 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1217. 
146 Id. 
147 Holloway, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1262. 
148 Id. at 1262 (emphasis added). 
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son may also fall outside First Amendment protection.”149  Magistrate 
Putnam concluded that the First Amendment did not bar Holloway’s 
“claim that publication of knowingly false information about her 
daughter’s disappearance constituted outrageous conduct where it 
was published with the intent and expectation that it would cause se-
vere emotional distress to her.”150 
In a nutshell, Holloway indicates that even if the underlying subject 
matter is about a matter of public concern,151 Snyder will not apply if 
1) the speech involves factual assertions, rather than expressions of 
opinions and viewpoints; 2) the factual assertions are false and the 
defendant does not honestly believe them to be true; and 3) the pub-
lication of the false factual assertions is motivated by a desire and in-
tent to attack or cause pain to the plaintiff.  This interpretation, of 
course,  represents the view of only one federal jurist thus far. 
Magistrate Putnam clearly rejected the defendants’ Snyder-based 
and extremely sweeping contention that they were “not liable to 
plaintiff on her tort claims because the published materials are ‘of 
public concern’ and thus are protected by the First Amendment[.]”152  
The defendants essentially swung hard and deep for a legal home run 
when “they accept[ed] the plaintiff’s allegations that the articles were 
false”153 and then cited Snyder as supporting the bright-line proposi-
tion “that the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment provides a 
bar to state-law tort claims that arise from speech on matters ‘of pub-
lic concern.’”154  In the end, however, they struck out. 
Magistrate Putnam’s decision is perhaps better understood 
through the lens of Falwell.  That initially is the case because both 
Falwell and Holloway involved IIED claims filed by public-figure plain-
tiffs.155  Second, Falwell held that such plaintiffs must prove, in addi-
tion to the basic common-law IIED elements, “that the publication 
contains a false statement of fact which was made with ‘actual malice,’ 
i. e., with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard 
 
149 Id. at 1263. 
150 Id. at 1264–65. 
151 In Holloway, the underlying subject matter was “the disappearance of Natalee Holloway, 
which dominated news coverage for many weeks, if not years, and which involved the 
safety of travel abroad and called up the worst fears of parents.”  Id. at 1261 n.10. 
152 Id. at 1254. 
153 Holloway v. Am. Media, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1262 (N.D. Ala. 2013). 
154 Id. at 1261. 
155 See id. at 1261 n.8 (observing that “the parties in this case do not dispute that Elizabeth 
Holloway, who sought publicity about the disappearance of her daughter and appeared 
frequently on television after Natalee disappeared . . .  is a public figure”). See supra notes 
49–52 (noting that Falwell was a public figure).  
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as to whether or not it was true.”156  In Holloway, it was undisputed that 
the offending articles involved facts157 that were false.158  Magistrate 
Putnam’s interpretation of Snyder then takes Elizabeth Holloway’s 
case home through the final step of Falwell, as he wrote that “Snyder 
implies that knowingly false speech motivated by a specific intent to cause 
emotional harm to a particular person may also fall outside First 
Amendment protection.”159 
2.  Outrageousness in Holloway 
The National Enquirer and its owner asserted that the conduct of 
publishing the articles was not extreme and outrageous and, thus, 
Elizabeth Ann Holloway’s IIED claim failed a basic element of the 
tort.160  Magistrate Putnam observed that under Alabama law, the ex-
treme-and-outrageous element requires atrocious and utterly intoler-
able conduct that goes beyond the bounds of decency in a civilized 
society such that IIED is available as a remedy “only under the most 
egregious circumstances.”161 
Importantly, Putnam acknowledged the case was one of first im-
pression in the Yellowhammer State, writing that “[t]here are no re-
ported Alabama cases where the underlying conduct allegedly caus-
ing the extreme emotional distress was a mere publication of 
information.”162  Yet, despite this precedential uncertainty, he also was 
“unwilling to find that published words alone can never be the basis 
for an outrage claim.”163 
In particular, he framed Elizabeth Ann Holloway’s IIED claim as 
arising “from graphic descriptions of the treatment of her daughter’s 
corpse.”164  Thus, while the Rodriguez case described in Part II.A deals 
with visual images of death captured at the moment it happens, Hol-
loway pivots on word-based descriptions of the remains of a presump-
tively already-dead individual.  Magistrate Putnam reasoned that 
[b]ecause “family burials” is one of the limited types of cases in which 
[IIED] has been applied, this court is unwilling to state as a matter of law 
 
156 Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (emphasis added). 
157 Holloway, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1261 n.9 (“It is also undisputed that the articles at issue pur-
ported to describe facts[.]”). 
158 See id. at 1262 (noting that the “[d]efendants . . . definitively stated that, for purposes of 
their motion, they accept[ed] the plaintiff’s allegations that the articles were false”). 
159 Id. at 1263 (emphasis added). 
160 See id. at 1265–67 (outlining the defendants’ arguments). 
161 Id. at 1266. 
162 Id. 
163 Holloway v. Am. Media, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1267 (N.D. Ala. 2013).  
164 Id. 
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that falsely reporting gruesome details of a daughter’s death, coupled 
with the intent to cause emotional distress, could never support a claim 
for outrage.165 
Ultimately, Holloway settled in 2013 before it could reach the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.166  The negative precedent 
for media defendants established by Magistrate Putnam in IIED cases, 
including his narrow reading of Snyder, thus is confined to the North-
ern District of Alabama.  Regardless of the amount of money forked 
out in the confidential settlement, the media defendants were able to 
control the precedential damage in Holloway by settling. 
Whether other courts adopt or distinguish Magistrate Putnam’s 
reasoning on Snyder and its impact on IIED claims remains to be 
seen. 
C.  Bollea v. Gawker Media, Inc.167 
Terry Gene Bollea, better known as Hulk Hogan, filed a com-
plaint in federal court in 2012 against the operators of the Gawker 
website for, among other theories, IIED.168  As part of that lawsuit, 
Bollea sought a preliminary injunction ordering Gawker to take down 
“excerpts from the Hulk Hogan sex tape that were posted on the 
www.Gawker.com website on or about October 4, 2012 and to enjoin 
Defendants from posting, publishing or releasing any portions or 
content of the sex tape to the public, including that or any other 
website.”169  According to Bollea, the tape was made without his 
knowledge about a half-dozen years earlier when he had sex with a 
woman who was not his wife.170 
In deciding whether to grant the injunction, U.S. District Judge 
James D. Whittemore quoted Snyder’s proclamation, which itself was 
drawn from the libel case of Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Build-
ers, Inc.,171 that “speech on matters of public concern . . . is at the 
heart of the First Amendment’s protection.”172  Judge Whittemore 
 
165 Id. 
166 See E-mail from L. Lin Wood, Esq., Wood, Hernacki & Evans, LLC, to author (Jan. 30, 
2014, 15:54 EST) (on file with author) (“The case settled shortly after the motion to dis-
miss was denied.”). 
167 No. 8:12–CV–02348–T–27TBM, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162711 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 14, 2012). 
168 Id. at *5. 
169 Id. at *2 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
170 Id. at *4. 
171 472 U.S. 749, 758–59 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
172 Bollea, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162711, at *6 (quoting Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 
1215 (2011)). 
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furthermore quoted173 Snyder’s disjunctive, two-part definition of pub-
lic concern,174 under which such speech is anything fairly considered 
to relate to any matter of political, social or other concern to the 
community or that relates to a subject of legitimate news interest.175 
Applying Snyder’s definition of public concern to the facts of the 
case, Judge Whittemore reasoned, 
[the] [p]laintiff’s public persona, including the publicity he and his fami-
ly derived from a television reality show detailing their personal life, his 
own book describing an affair he had during his marriage, prior reports 
by other parties of the existence and content of the Video, and Plaintiff’s 
own public discussion of issues relating to his marriage, sex life, and the 
Video all demonstrate that the Video is a subject of general interest and 
concern to the community.176 
Judge Whittemore thus concluded that, at least at the preliminary in-
junction stage, the decision regarding whether to post excerpts from 
the sex tape “is appropriately left to [the] editorial discretion”177 of 
Gawker.  Because he was only considering whether an injunction 
should be issued, Judge Whittemore did not address the substantive 
elements of IIED and, in particular, the question of whether posting 
parts of the video constituted extreme and outrageous conduct. 
Nonetheless, Bollea indicates that Snyder’s definition of public con-
cern can be stretched quite far beyond the narrow context of hoisting 
printed signs—ones emblazoned with written words of both political 
and religious protest regarding American tolerance of homosexuality 
and sexual abuse by the clergy—to the salacious and sordid visual-
imagery world of fading-glory celebrity sex tapes. 
Significantly, Judge Whittemore’s opinion did not end the tale of 
the titillating tape.  In January 2014, a Florida appellate court in 
Gawker Media, LLC v. Bollea178—Bollea dropped his federal claim after 
losing before Judge Whittemore and then chose to test his luck in the 
Florida state court system—held that injunctive relief stopping Gawk-
er from posting excerpts of the video and a narrative of it amounted 
to an unconstitutional prior restraint.179  In doing so, the Florida ap-
pellate court quoted Snyder for the proposition that speech about 
 
173 Id. at *7 (“Speech deals with matters of public concern when it can be fairly considered as 
relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community, or when it 
is a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of value 
and concern to the public.” (quoting Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1216 (2011)). 
174 See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text (setting forth the two-part test). 
175 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1216 (2011) (providing the two-part test). 
176 Bollea, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162711, at *8. 
177 Id. at *9. 
178 129 So. 3d 1196 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
179 Id. at 1198. 
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matters of public concern lies at the heart of the First Amendment.180  
It then had little trouble holding that it was “clear that as a result of 
the public controversy surrounding the affair and the Sex Tape, ex-
acerbated in part by Mr. Bollea himself, the report and the related 
video excerpts address matters of public concern.”181  The unanimous 
three-judge panel added that the fact that the tape dealt with sexual 
content did not, in and of itself, remove it from the realm of public 
concern.182  The only limitation noted by the Florida appellate court 
was that “[d]espite Mr. Bollea’s public persona, we do not suggest 
that every aspect of his private life is a subject of public concern.”183  
Ultimately, in ruling in favor of Gawker, the court reasoned that, 
the written report and video excerpts are linked to a matter of public 
concern—Mr. Bollea’s extramarital affair and the video evidence of 
such—as there was ongoing public discussion about the affair and the 
Sex Tape, including by Mr. Bollea himself.  Therefore, Mr. Bollea failed 
to meet the heavy burden to overcome the presumption that the tempo-
rary injunction is invalid as an unconstitutional prior restraint under the 
First Amendment.184 
The bottom line is that while the U.S. Supreme Court in Snyder 
embraced the concept of public concern as a touchstone in an IIED 
case involving weighty, gravitas-laden issues such as government poli-
cies tolerating homosexuality and sexual abuse by the clergy, Rodri-
guez stretched it to include televised car chases, and both Bollea cases 
found that it encompassed celebrity sex tapes and the sexual affairs of 
celebrities.  Neither Rodriguez nor Bollea did anything to suggest that 
public concern constitutes a narrow category of expression; rather, it 
is vast and sweeping.  Bollea thus clearly falls in line with the predic-
tion of Professor Lidsky that Snyder would prove a boon for media de-
fendants when litigating tort cases.185 
D.  Best v. Berard186 
Of the four post-Snyder and media-defendant IIED cases addressed 
in this Part, Best represents what is arguably the most obvious, clear-
cut case of the speech in question being about a matter of public 
 
180 Id. at 1200. 
181 Id. at 1201 (footnote omitted). 
182 Id. (“[T]he mere fact that the publication contains arguably inappropriate and otherwise 
sexually explicit content does not remove it from the realm of legitimate public inter-
est.”). 
183 Id.  
184 Gawker Media, LLC v. Bollea, 129 So. 3d 1196, 1202 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
185 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
186 776 F. Supp. 2d 752 (N.D. Ill. 2011). 
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concern and the defendants’ conduct, in turn, not being extreme 
and outrageous.  This comes despite the fact that Best involves con-
tent that some people might classify as “infotainment.”187 
The case centered on plaintiff Eran Best’s claim that her involun-
tary depiction on the reality television show Female Forces188—a depic-
tion that showed her, among other things, taking a field sobriety test, 
being arrested for driving on a suspended license and talking about 
how she “likes Coach purses, bags, and shoes”189—“caused her severe 
emotional distress.”190  The episode featuring Best’s arrest, which oc-
curred in Naperville, Illinois, also included a police officer stating, 
“Do I feel sorry for [Best]?  No.  Pretty little blond girl, 25 years old, 
driving a Jaguar-yeah, that’s Naperville.”191  Additionally, the segment 
included footage, taken inside the police car where Best was held, 
that focused “on a dashboard computer, on which information about 
Best—including her date of birth, height, weight, driver’s license 
number, and brief descriptions of previous arrests and traffic stops—
[was] displayed.”192  The segment ran more than two dozen times on 
the Biography Channel.193 
Although the case was decided on March 3, 2011194—just one day 
after the Supreme Court decided Snyder—U.S. District Judge Matthew 
F. Kennelly nonetheless cited both Snyder’s observation that the con-
tours of public concern “are not well defined”195 and its disjunctive 
definition of public concern, namely: 
[S]peech deals with matters of public concern when it can be fairly con-
sidered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to 
the community, or when it is a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, 
a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public.196 
In determining whether the Female Forces segment featuring Eran 
Best’s arrest fell within this definition, Judge Kennelly initially ob-
 
187 See Richard T. Karcher, Tort Law and Journalism Ethics, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 781, 797 (2009) 
(discussing “infotainment” and defining it as “[t]he entertainment format of news report-
ing”). 
188 The show “is an unscripted ‘reality’ television series that follows female police officers as 
they perform their duties and interact with members of the public.” Best, 776 F. Supp. 2d 
at 754. 
189 Id. at 755. 
190 Id. at 753. 
191 Id. at 755 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
192 Id. 
193 See Best v. Berard, 776 F. Supp. 2d 752, 755 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (“[The episode] has been re-
broadcast thirty times on that channel since December 14, 2008.”). 
194 See id. at 752 (noting the case was both decided and filed on March 3, 2011). 
195 Id. at 757 (quoting Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1216 (2011) (additional citations 
and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
196 Id. (quoting Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at, 1216) (emphasis added). 
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served that “courts have repeatedly held that information about ar-
rests rises to the level of public concern.”197  Finding “no contrary au-
thority”198 to this classification of arrests as matters of public concern, 
the judge concluded that the defendants’ “depiction of Best’s arrest 
and its surrounding circumstances—including the computer screen 
shots giving information about prior arrests or citations—conveyed 
truthful information on matters of public concern protected by the 
First Amendment.”199 
The fact that some people might consider Female Forces to be more 
entertainment than news, Judge Kennelly wrote, “does not alter the 
First Amendment analysis.”200  He cited favorably here201 the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s 1948 ruling in Winters v. New York.202  There, the Court 
reasoned that “[t]he line between the informing and the entertaining 
is too elusive for the protection of that basic right.  Everyone is famil-
iar with instances of propaganda through fiction.  What is one man’s 
amusement, teaches another’s doctrine.”203 
Furthermore, the fact that the underlying alleged criminal activity 
leading to Best’s arrest was merely driving with a suspended license 
rather than something more serious, such as murder or assault, made 
no difference to Judge Kennelly.204  He observed that newspapers rou-
tinely print information about many types of arrests in their blot-
ters,205 and he found “no authority to support drawing this sort of dis-
tinction in determining the First Amendment’s application”206 
between serious and minor criminal offenses.  He thus concluded 
that Female Forces “depicted, in Best’s case, an arrest on criminal 
charges and facts concerning prior arrests or citations.  These are le-
gitimate matters of public concern, even if Best’s encounters with the 
police involved conduct that was arguably toward the lower end of 
 
197 Id. 
198 Id. at 758. 
199 See Best v. Berard, 776 F. Supp. 2d 752, 758 (N.D. Ill. 2011) 
200 Id.  
201 Id. (“‘[T]he line between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the protec-
tion of th[e] basic right’ of a free press.” (quoting Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 
(1948))). 
202 333 U.S. 507 (1948). 
203 Id. at 510.  The final sentence in this quotation foreshadows the Supreme Court’s dicta 
more than two decades later that “one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric.” Cohen v. Cali-
fornia, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971). 
204 See Best, 776 F. Supp. 2d at 758 (“[Best’s actions] are legitimate matters of public concern, 
even if Best’s encounters with the police involved conduct that was arguably toward the 
lower end of the spectrum of criminality.”). 
205 See id. (“The Court notes that it is relatively commonplace for newspapers to reprint ‘po-
lice blotter’-type information involving arrests.”) 
206 Id. 
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the spectrum of criminality.”207  Judge Kennelly therefore found that 
the First Amendment precluded Best’s IIED theory.208  The judge 
never addressed whether the actions in question were extreme and 
outrageous within the meaning of IIED. 
In summary, the concept of public concern post-Snyder was suffi-
ciently expansive in Rodriguez, Bollea and Best to shield the media de-
fendants from liability for IIED based upon the publication of alleg-
edly outrageous speech by members of the media.  On the other 
hand, in Holloway, the court readily acknowledged that the disap-
pearance of Natalee Holloway was also a matter of public concern,209 
but Magistrate Putnam nonetheless refused to stretch Snyder’s hold-
ing to protect the National Enquirer. 
The next two Parts circle back to Rodriguez to consider aspects of 
the IIED claim therein that reach beyond the confines of the public 
concern issue—namely, increasing legal worry about the publication 
of images of death in the Internet era and the reality that televised 
car chases are, in fact, well known to end in the broadcast of such im-
ages. 
III.  GROWING CONCERNS OVER IMAGES OF DEATH:  THE INTERNET AS A 
GAME CHANGER AND HOW IT COULD AFFECT IIED CASES LIKE 
RODRIGUEZ IN THE FUTURE 
This Part, as well as Part IV, returns to explore in greater detail 
aspects of the case of Rodriguez v. Fox News Network, LLC that went un-
addressed in Part II.A above.  Specifically, this Part illustrates how 
growing legal squeamishness toward death-scene images, at least in 
the realms of public records laws and privacy rights, might—if not in 
Rodriguez—eventually spill over into the realm of IIED.  Part IV then 
returns to media coverage of car chases, but this time focusing on the 
reasonable foreseeability of televised death as one result of such re-
portage. 
Rodriguez arose at a time when both lawmakers and courts across 
the country seemed particularly concerned about the emotional 
harm that might be caused to family members by viewing graphic im-
 
207 Id. 
208 While Judge Kennelly’s analysis of the public concern issue came within the context of 
considering an Illinois statutory theory—dubbed “Count 2”—alleging that the use of 
Best’s identity for commercial purposes without her written consent violated her rights, 
he nonetheless wrote that “[t]he First Amendment analysis that the Court has applied to 
Count 2 likewise warrants a similar outcome for Best’s claims for invasion of privacy 
(count 3) and intentional infliction of emotional distress (count 4).”  Id. at 759. 
209 Supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
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ages of the death or dead bodies of their relatives.  In the wake of the 
killings at Sandy Hook Elementary School, for instance, Connecticut 
in 2013 amended its public records law to exempt from disclosure 
any record “consisting of a photograph, film, video or digital or other 
visual image depicting the victim of a homicide, to the extent that 
such record could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwar-
ranted invasion of the personal privacy of the victim or the victim’s 
surviving family members.”210  A dozen years earlier, following the 
death of NASCAR driver Dale Earnhardt, Florida carved out from its 
public records law an exemption for “[a] photograph or video or au-
dio recording of an autopsy held by a medical examiner.”211  Addi-
tionally, Georgia recently created a crime-scene exemption in its 
open records laws for images depicting a “deceased person in a state 
of dismemberment, decapitation, or similar mutilation . . . .”212  The 
exemption was adopted after the murder of Meredith Emerson, who 
was killed in 2008 while hiking in the Georgia mountains.213 
The worry about the release of images in these and other instanc-
es seems largely driven by the fact that the death images might, pre-
cisely as they did in Rodriguez, end up on the Internet.  As one com-
mentator notes, “family members are left devastated by the 
unwarranted invasion to privacy that occurs when the intimate visual 
depictions of a loved one’s death are published to the Internet, and 
made available for mass viewing.”214 
The worry today has moved beyond the realm of open records 
laws described above215 and into the terrain of constitutional law.  In 
Marsh v. County of San Diego,216 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit in 2012 recognized “[t]he long-standing tradition of respect-
 
210 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-210(b)(27) (2013). 
211 FLA. STAT. § 406.135(2) (2012). 
212 The provision provides, in relevant part, that: 
Crime scene photographs and video recordings, including photographs and video 
recordings created or produced by a state or local agency or by a perpetrator or 
suspect at a crime scene, which depict or describe a deceased person in a state of 
dismemberment, decapitation, or similar mutilation including, without limitation, 
where the deceased person’s genitalia are exposed, shall not be subject to disclo-
sure . . . . 
  GA. CODE ANN. § 45-16-27(e)(1) (2014). 
213 See Brenda Goodman, Killing of a Young Hiker Puts North Georgia on Edge, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
14, 2008, at A12 (discussing Meredith Emerson’s death and the impact of her death on 
her community). 
214 Christine M. Emery, Note, Relational Privacy—A Right to Grieve in the Information Age:  Halt-
ing the Digital Dissemination of Death-Scene Images, 42 RUTGERS L.J. 765, 771 (2011). 
215 See supra text accompanying notes 210–13. 
216 680 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2012). 
468 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 17:2 
 
ing family members’ privacy in death images.”217  Alex Kozinski, Chief 
Judge of the Ninth Circuit, wrote for a unanimous three-judge panel 
in Marsh: 
Few things are more personal than the graphic details of a close family 
member’s tragic death.  Images of the body usually reveal a great deal 
about the manner of death and the decedent’s suffering during his final 
moments—all matters of private grief not generally shared with the world 
at large.218 
In Marsh, the Ninth Circuit became the first federal appellate 
court to recognize a substantive due process familial privacy right to 
control public dissemination of a family member’s death images.219  
Chief Judge Kozinski wrote that “the Constitution protects a parent’s 
right to control the physical remains, memory and images of a de-
ceased child against unwarranted public exploitation by the govern-
ment.”220 
The plaintiff-mother in Marsh was concerned that graphic autopsy 
images of her son that were leaked to the news media by a former 
government employee might end up on the Internet.221  Chief Judge 
Kozinski wrote that her “fear [was] not unreasonable given the viral 
nature of the Internet, where she might easily stumble upon photo-
graphs of her dead son on news websites, blogs or social media web-
sites.”222 
In Rodriguez, the images of death also ended up on the Internet, 
where they were viewed by the deceased’s sons.223  The major differ-
ence, of course, is that Rodriguez is not a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, but 
rather a civil tort action not involving a government agency or offi-
cial.  Yet courts have recognized that the public dissemination of ei-
ther death images or remains of loved ones may constitute valid 
claims for IIED by their relatives in extreme circumstances.224 
 
217 Id. at 1154. 
218 Id. 
219 See id. (“So far as we are aware, then, this is the first case to consider whether the common 
law right to non-interference with a family’s remembrance of a decedent is so ingrained 
in our traditions that it is constitutionally protected [by substantive due process].”). 
220 Id. 
221 See id. at 1155 (noting that Marsh claimed to have suffered severe emotional distress due 
to the fear that she would come across her son’s autopsy photos displayed on the Inter-
net). 
222 Marsh v. Cnty. of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1155 (9th Cir. 2012).  
223 Rodriguez Complaint, supra note 90, at 4. 
224 See, e.g., Catsouras v. Dep’t of Cal. Highway Patrol, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 352, 366–67 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2010), modified and reh’g denied, No. 07CC07817, 2010 Cal. App. LEXIS 253 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2010) (centering on the public distribution, by members of the California Highway 
Patrol, of images of a nearly decapitated young woman who was killed in a car accident); 
Armstrong v. H & C Comm., Inc., 575 So. 2d 280 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (centering on 
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In recognizing a constitutional right of familial control over imag-
es of death, the Ninth Circuit in Marsh cited and built upon the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s 2004 opinion in National Archives & Records Admin-
istration v. Favish.225  In Favish, the Court recognized a familial privacy 
right over death-scene images within the context of Exemption 7(C) 
of the federal Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”).226  But Justice 
Anthony Kennedy, in writing for the Court, went beyond FOIA and 
found that the “well-established cultural tradition acknowledging a 
family’s control over the body and death images of the deceased has 
long been recognized at common law.”227  Kennedy added that 
“[f]amily members have a personal stake in honoring and mourning 
their dead and objecting to unwarranted public exploitation that, by 
intruding upon their own grief, tends to degrade the rites and re-
spect they seek to accord to the deceased person who was once their 
own.”228 
This Author calls Favish the “key decision in the area of familial 
privacy rights over death-scene images.”229  Professors Samuel Terilli 
and Sigman Splichal argue that Favish is but one example of increas-
ingly “deep societal concerns regarding the privacy rights and feel-
ings of family members—concerns heightened by technology (the In-
ternet and digital reproduction, for example).”230 
Some of those concerns are embodied in state statutes restricting 
public access to autopsy images.  As Professor Jeffrey R. Boles wrote in 
2012, “[l]egislatures and courts have accorded greater privacy protec-
tion to autopsy and death scene photographs than to any other type 
of death record.  Numerous state statutes explicitly render these pho-
tographs inaccessible to the public.”231  Professor Boles, in accord with 
 
the broadcast, by a television station during a newscast, of the image of the skull of a 
young girl, and allowing a claim for the tort of outrage to proceed where the television 
station both staged a close-up shot of the girl’s skull and then aired footage the same day 
of a memorial service being held for her). 
225 541 U.S. 157 (2004) (holding that families have a statutory right to privacy regarding the 
public release of information about a loved one’s death). 
226 Id. at 171 (opining that “the personal privacy protected by Exemption 7(C) extends to 
family members who object to the disclosure of graphic details surrounding their rela-
tive’s death . . . .”). 
227 Id. at 168. 
228 Id. 
229 Clay Calvert, Dying for Privacy:  Pitting Public Access Against Familial Interests in the Era of the 
Internet, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 18, 22–23 (2010). 
230 Samuel A. Terilli & Sigman L. Splichal, Public Access to Autopsy and Death-Scene Photographs:  
Relational Privacy, Public Records and Avoidable Collisions, 10 COMM. L. & POL’Y 313, 341 
(2005). 
231 Jeffrey R. Boles, Documenting Death:  Public Access to Government Death Records and Attendant 
Privacy Concerns, 22 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 237, 285 (2012). 
470 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 17:2 
 
the reasoning of Professors Terilli and Splichal, asserts that “[t]he 
special danger inherent in a photograph’s release is its unseemly, 
sensationalistic mass reproduction, particularly through the Inter-
net.”232  Professors Boles, Terilli, and Splichal are not alone in recog-
nizing the emotionally destructive power of the Internet when it 
comes to the posting of images of death.233 
How might this legal trend of increasing concern about the emo-
tional harm caused by images of death in the Internet era be of im-
portance in Rodriguez and other IIED cases based upon the media’s 
publication of death images?  Rather than granting a motion to dis-
miss, some courts might allow cases filed by relatives of the deceased 
to proceed to a jury on the question of whether or not airing a live 
suicide constitutes extreme and outrageous conduct on the part of 
the news media, in a decade where it is clearly foreseeable that such 
images might go viral on the Internet.  
Arizona Revised Statute § 12-752, for instance, governs motions to 
dismiss in the Grand Canyon State, and it applied in Rodriguez.234  As 
interpreted by the Arizona Supreme Court in 2012, dismissal under 
this section is appropriate “only if ‘as a matter of law [] plaintiffs 
would not be entitled to relief under any interpretation of the facts 
susceptible of proof.’”235  Furthermore, at the MTD stage, “courts 
must assume the truth of all well-pleaded factual allegations and in-
dulge all reasonable inferences from those facts . . . .”236  The court, at 
the MTD stage, “does not resolve factual disputes between the parties 
on an undeveloped record.”237 
Although Judge Rea dismissed Rodriguez, there may come a point 
when other judges, perhaps disillusioned with the voyeuristic and 
sensational tendencies of today’s news media, finally decide to let the 
public—namely, juries—sort out whether live coverage of death and 
images of the dead is extreme and outrageous conduct.  Judicial con-
cern about relational privacy rights in cases like Marsh and Favish 
 
232 Id. at 286. 
233 See, e.g., Catherine Leibowitz, Note, “A Right to be Spared Unhappiness”:  Images of Death and 
The Expansion of the Relational Right of Privacy, 32 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 347, 375 
(2013) (“While the Internet has greatly fostered the public’s ability to communicate, it 
has also, unfortunately, proven how people can abuse the Internet for depraved rea-
sons[,]” and arguing that “[i]n order to deter private individuals from disseminating im-
ages of death at the expense of the deceased’s relatives, state courts should allow damage 
actions against private individuals.”) 
234 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-752 (2007). 
235 Coleman v. City of Mesa, 284 P.3d 863, 867 (Ariz. 2012) (quoting Fid. Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. 
State Dep’t of Ins., 954 P.2d 580, 582 (Ariz. 1998)). 
236 Id. 
237 Id. at 874. 
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might flow over into the realm of IIED.  For now, however, Marsh and 
Favish remain confined as cases about restricting access to images of 
death possessed by government officials and agencies, rather than ex-
tending tort liability to the publication of such images.  Perhaps a lit-
tle bit more caution and care by the likes of Fox News Channel the 
next time it airs a car chase—from the effective use of tape-delay 
mechanisms to not even showing a chase until immediately after it 
ends, so that any images of death can be edited out238—will prevent 
legal concerns about access to death images from migrating to IIED 
claims like Rodriguez. 
IV.  THE FORESEEABLE SPECTACLE OF TELEVISED DEATH:  ROLLING THE 
LEGAL DICE WITH LIFE AND DEATH 
In its motion to dismiss in Rodriguez, Fox News asserted that its 
coverage of the car chase of JoDon Romero “ended in an act of vio-
lence that could not have been foreseen.”239  It added that “[l]ive tele-
vision coverage of newsworthy events is inherently fast-paced and of-
ten unpredictable[.]”240 
In fact, however, television news organizations are arguably well 
aware that such broadcasts might end in a violent death.  More than a 
dozen years ago—back in January 2000—Broadcasting and Cable maga-
zine began a story with these two paragraphs: 
 The unpredictability of a police car chase has again been demon-
strated for viewers, as a Phoenix audience several days ago watched as po-
lice shot a suspect to death after a wild pursuit, leaving pundits and pub-
lic questioning the propriety of the chase-in-progress’ emergence in an 
increasingly infotainment medium. 
With at least one earlier suicide and another fatal shooting by police 
broadcast live from TV helicopters—both in Southern California, where 
the car chase has become a television staple—death cannot be denied as a 
possible outcome.241 
In 1998, MSNBC aired live the suicide of Daniel Jones on a Los 
Angeles freeway after he “unfurled a banner protesting health 
maintenance organizations. . . .”242  CNN, in contrast, anticipated the 
possible violent death and did not air it.243  Was it foreseeable that 
 
238 See supra note 120 and accompanying text (describing such options). 
239 Rodriguez Motion to Dismiss, supra note 83, at 2. 
240 Id. at 10. 
241 Dan Trigoboff, Shooting Raises Coverage Issues, BROAD. & CABLE, Jan. 31, 2000, at 13 (em-
phasis added). 
242 Peter Johnson, MSNBC to Add Delay After Showing Suicide, USA TODAY, May 4, 1998, at 3D. 
243 Id. (stating that CNN, though monitoring Jones’ actions, chose not to air the live foot-
age). 
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Jones’ death might be aired live?  “It was bound to happen. . . .  Any 
time you cover something live and un-edited you’re taking a risk[,]” 
stated Warren Cereghino, an executive producer for the owner of TV 
station KCOP, which aired live the suicide.244  More succinctly, Los 
Angeles Times television critic Howard Rosenberg wrote in the after-
math of the Jones suicide:  “Live coverage of a volatile situation is the 
equivalent of playing Russian roulette.”245 
In 1999, Southern California TV viewers watched a man named 
Michael Thayer get shot to death after he “came out of his car and 
was killed in a hail of police bullets . . . .”246  Indeed, as journalist Eric 
Nusbaum wrote in the aftermath of the events giving rise to the com-
plaint in Rodriguez, “the promise of a grisly or dramatic ending is what 
gives the police pursuit its power.”247  Televised death on the news 
continues today, with KTLA-TV Channel 5 in Los Angeles showing 
live in December 2013 Brian Newt Beaird being shot to death by 
members of the Los Angeles Police Department after a pursuit when 
he crashed his car and tried to stagger away.248 
Why is all of this relevant for the IIED tort in cases like Rodriguez?  
Because it illustrates that news organizations such as the Fox News 
Channel clearly should be aware of the chance that live coverage of a 
car chase like that involving JoDon Romero will end in a violent 
death.  Under the elements of IIED, it is not a requirement that the 
defendant must intend to cause the plaintiff to suffer emotional dis-
tress.  Rather, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
wrote in 2013, it is sufficient that the defendant acted with a “reckless 
disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress[.]”249  This has 
been interpreted broadly to mean giving little or no thought to the 
potential consequences of one’s actions.250  As Professor John Kircher 
 
244 Patrick Rogers, L.A.’s TV News:  Pulling Away from Live Shots?, AM. JOURNALISM REV., June 
1998, available at http://ajrarchive.org/article.asp?id=2318 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
245 Howard Rosenberg, The Russian Roulette of Live News Coverage, L.A. TIMES, May 2, 1998, 
http://articles.latimes.com/1998/may/02/entertainment/ca-45412. 
246 Dan Trigoboff, Another California Highway Shootout, BROAD. & CABLE, Dec. 6, 1999, at 56. 
247 Eric Nusbaum, ‘Horribly Wrong’—Fox’s Live Suicide and the Thrill of the Police Chase, DAILY 
BEAST, Sept. 30, 2012, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/09/30/horribly-
wrong-fox-s-live-suicide-and-the-thrill-of-the-police-chase.html. 
248 See Kate Mather & Richard Winton, LAPD Chief: ‘Very Thorough’ Inquiry into Fatal Shooting 
Underway, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2013, http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-in-lapd-
inquiry-fatal-shooting-20131217-story.html (describing the event). 
249 Lawler v. Montblanc N. Am., LLC, 704 F.3d 1235, 1245 (9th Cir. 2013) (emphasis added) 
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
250 See Miller v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 682 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (interpreting 
the meaning of “reckless disregard”). 
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notes, “[r]ecklessness could be characterized as engaging in conduct 
with conscious disregard of its consequences.”251  The comments to 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts suggest that reckless disregard means 
conduct engaged in with “deliberate disregard of a high degree of 
probability that the emotional distress will follow.”252 
As Rodriguez now works its way through the appellate court process 
in Arizona, it will be interesting to see if such points about the fore-
seeability and probability of death following car chases are raised by 
the attorney for the plaintiffs and, in turn, if they carry the day with 
the appellate court. 
CONCLUSION 
Writing in 2012, Professor Mark Strasser fittingly characterized the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s definition of public concern in Snyder v. Phelps 
as “a very forgiving standard”253 that “would include a whole host of 
subjects . . . .”254  The post-Snyder IIED cases of Rodriguez, Bollea and 
Best examined in this Article clearly prove Professor Strasser’s point, 
as well as the predictions of First Amendment scholars such as Joseph 
Russomanno, who speculated that “[a]fter Snyder, intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress is weaker—and perhaps disabled—in 
claims stemming from speech.  First Amendment protection is now 
stronger.  The circumstances under which an intentional infliction 
claim could prevail have narrowed.”255 
From a live-televised car chase and suicide involving a previously 
unknown individual to an old hidden-camera sex tape of a well-
known celebrity posted on the Internet to a reality television show 
depicting the arrest of a heretofore private individual for a minor 
crime, all three IIED cases were held to involve matters of public con-
cern.  These subjects are all far, far removed from the underlying 
facts of Snyder.  The decisions in Rodriguez, Bollea and Best thus are 
clear First Amendment victories for media defendants in IIED cases 
involving both private (Rodriguez and Best) and public (Bollea) figures. 
Although Chief Justice John Roberts wrote in Snyder that the ma-
jority’s holding was both “narrow”256 and “limited by the particular 
 
251 John J. Kircher, The Four Faces of Tort Law:  Liability for Emotional Harm, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 
789, 799 (2007). 
252 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 66, at § 46 cmt. i. 
253 Mark Strasser, What’s It to You:  The First Amendment and Matters of Public Concern, 77 MO. L. 
REV. 1083, 1117 (2012). 
254 Id. at 1118. 
255 Russomanno, supra note 10, at 171. 
256 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011). 
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facts before us[,]”257 not one of the courts in Rodriguez, Bollea or Best 
cited that language or otherwise felt constrained by it.  All three 
courts, instead, metaphorically waved it off and extended Snyder’s 
public-concern focus to very different facts.  Snyder emphasized that 
the content, context, and form of speech were three factors to be 
weighed in the public concern determination.258  The courts in Rodri-
guez, Bollea and Best had no trouble finding public concern when the 
speech in question was very different from Snyder across all three vari-
ables. 
All five cases examined here, including Snyder, were determined 
by courts to involve matters of public concern.  Yet, as the table im-
mediately below illustrates, they factually cut across the trio of public-
concern variables—content, context and form—in very different 
ways. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While Snyder did not involve a media defendant, the cases of Ro-
driguez, Bollea and Best all did.  Why is this important?  Because judi-
cial deployment of a very soft and nebulous concept like public con-
cern in IIED-based, media-defendant cases carries the very real 
possibility of the constitutional public-concern defense from Snyder 
eventually swallowing the IIED tort.  In particular, when a media de-
fendant is involved, additional First Amendment concerns about 
 
257 Id. 
258 Id. at 1216. 
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freedom of the press—not simply freedom of speech—come into play 
that were not present in Snyder.  Those concerns arguably may lead to 
even greater judicial deference259 paid toward IIED media defendants 
when interpreting the meaning of the already vague notion of public 
concern.  This is consistent with how courts often are similarly con-
cerned with providing deference to media defendants when consider-
ing newsworthiness and matters of public concern in the public dis-
closure of private facts tort.260  In brief, judicial deference, when 
coupled with the squishy concept of public concern, constitutes a 
highly favorable formula for media defendants in IIED cases after 
Snyder. 
Although Holloway also involved a matter of public concern—the 
disappearance of, and search for, Natalee Holloway261—Magistrate 
Putnam’s decision is the only one of the four cases examined here to 
draw a line on the scope of Snyder.  As noted earlier, Magistrate Put-
nam held that Snyder will not protect the news media, even when a 
matter of public concern clearly is involved, if the speech consists of 
false factual assertions that are published with the motivation, desire, 
and intent to attack or cause pain to an IIED plaintiff.262 
While public concern in Snyder represents a constitutional re-
quirement grafted onto the common law IIED tort to provide a check 
on the subjective and equally pliable element of extreme and outra-
geous conduct, it may well be that the two concepts are simply in-
versely correlated.  Specifically, the more the speech in question is 
about a matter of public concern, the less likely it is for publication of 
that speech to be deemed extreme and outrageous.  For instance, if 
one considers car chases by law enforcement officials to be matters of 
public concern, then it is much harder to argue that the news me-
dia’s decision to air them live—from high-speed start through suicid-
 
259 See Daniel J. Solove, The Darkest Domain:  Deference, Judicial Review, and the Bill of Rights, 84 
IOWA L. REV. 941, 943 (1999) (stating that deference amounts to “a type of judicial self-
restraint”). 
260 See Shulman v. Grp. W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 485 (Cal. 1998) (“An analysis measuring 
newsworthiness of facts about an otherwise private person involuntarily involved in an 
event of public interest by their relevance to a newsworthy subject matter incorporates 
considerable deference to reporters and editors, avoiding the likelihood of unconstitu-
tional interference with the freedom of the press . . . .”); see also Danielle Keats Citron, 
Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1805, 1829 (2010) (“Free speech concerns 
impact the efficacy of privacy torts as well.  Courts dismiss public disclosure claims where 
information addresses a newsworthy matter, in other words, one of public concern.  They 
often defer to the media’s judgment, all but guaranteeing the demise of plaintiffs’ 
claims.”) (citations omitted). 
261 See Holloway v. Am. Media, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1261 n.10 (N.D. Ala. 2013). 
262 Id. at 1254, 1261–62. 
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al finish—is outrageous.  Similarly, if one considers the sex lives of ce-
lebrities to be matters of public concern, then it is difficult to simul-
taneously find that the publication of excerpts of videotapes depict-
ing those same celebrities having sex is extreme and outrageous.  In 
this sense, then, initial judicial resolution of the constitutional public-
concern question largely dictates how courts will later resolve the 
common law question of whether publication of the speech was ex-
treme and outrageous. 
How might future courts—perhaps plaintiff-sympathetic ones 
concerned with the possibility that Snyder’s emphasis on speech about 
matters of public concern might eventually swallow up most of the 
IIED tort in speech-publication cases—attempt to limit Snyder’s reach?  
The starting point, of course, would be to seize on Chief Justice Rob-
erts’ unambiguous statement that “the reach of our opinion here is 
limited by the particular facts before us.”263 
From there, a court might do as Magistrate Putnam did in Hol-
loway and suggest that Snyder is simply a case about protecting opinions 
and viewpoints on matters of public concern, not about protecting fac-
tual assertions.264  In this perspective, Snyder was concerned only with 
shielding speakers from tort liability for expressing outrageously of-
fensive ideas and viewpoints in the context of public debate.  Thus, 
the Snyder Court found it important to quote265 the late Justice Wil-
liam Brennan’s statement in the flag-burning case of Texas v. John-
son266 that “[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First 
Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expres-
sion of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or 
disagreeable.”267 
Had Judge Rea embraced this narrow view in Rodriguez, it would 
have gutted the Snyder-grounded public concern defense since Rodri-
guez dealt with facts, not viewpoints.  Falwell, in turn, would not have 
helped Fox News because the Rodriguez plaintiffs are private individu-
als, namely minors.  Without Snyder and Falwell, then, Rodriguez would 
need to be decided simply upon the four basic common law elements 
of IIED.  Setting aside the plaintiffs’ major problem with proving cau-
sation of harm described in the case earlier,268 the malleable element 
of extreme-and-outrageous conduct would likely have played a pivotal 
 
263 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1220. 
264 Holloway, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1261 & nn.9 & 11. 
265 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1219. 
266 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
267 Id. at 414 (emphasis added). 
268 See supra notes 102–103.  
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role in the outcome of Rodriguez.  The doctrinal issue, then, is wheth-
er it is better to counter a malleable common law element (outra-
geous speech/conduct) with an equally pliable constitutional one 
(public concern).  As this Article has demonstrated, public concern is 
an immensely expansive concept, but one that stretches in favor of 
First Amendment interests. 
Conversely, it should be noted that even if the federal and state 
courts in Bollea had applied this narrow “viewpoints-only, not-facts” 
interpretation of Snyder to the substance of the IIED claim in that 
case, Gawker still would have prevailed under a relatively straightfor-
ward application of Falwell.  Under Falwell, the public-figure plaintiff, 
Terry Gene Bollea, would have needed to prove that Gawker con-
veyed a false factual assertion with actual malice.269  The videotape at 
issue, and accompanying narrative of it, were true factual assertions— 
thus ending the IIED inquiry and protecting Gawker’s First Amend-
ment rights of free speech and press.  Parsed differently, the court’s 
focus in Bollea on Snyder’s emphasis on matters of public concern may 
have been relevant at the preliminary injunction stage, but it would 
have been irrelevant for the motion to dismiss the IIED claim because 
Falwell already provides sufficient protection. 
Such a Falwell-based successful outcome for the media defendant 
in Bollea actually raises another related point.  Given Snyder’s unique 
facts and Chief Justice Roberts’ statements about the narrowness of its 
holding, media defense attorneys might be wise not to trot it out too 
often and, instead, only use it when Falwell will not protect them.  In 
other words, there may be a breaking point where defendants essen-
tially overuse and abuse Snyder by trying to factually analogize the 
matters of public concern within it to those in every case that comes 
down the pike.  Eventually, the factual analogies may become too 
farfetched that a judge simply does not buy them and refuses to find 
a matter of public concern at stake. 
A second and much more controversial way to limit Snyder’s reach 
would be to factually confine it to cases involving non-media defend-
ants, as was the scenario with the members of the Westboro Baptist 
Church.  This solution seems particularly untenable, however, in light 
of decisions such as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s 
January 2014 ruling in Obsidian Finance Group v. Cox.270  There, the 
 
269 See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (“[P]ublic figures and public 
officials may not recover for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress by rea-
son of publications such as the one here at issue without showing in addition that the 
publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with ‘actual malice[.]’”). 
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Ninth Circuit held, in the context of a defamation case and consider-
ing whether to apply constitutional fault-based protections to a blog-
ger, that “a First Amendment distinction between the institutional 
press and other speakers is unworkable[.]”271 
This comports directly with the U.S. Supreme Court’s refusal in 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n to delineate between corpo-
rate and non-corporate speakers.272  Justice Anthony Kennedy opined 
for the majority in Citizens United that the First Amendment forbids 
“restrictions distinguishing among different speakers, allowing 
speech by some but not others”273 and that “[s]peech restrictions 
based on the identity of the speaker are all too often simply a means 
to control content.”274  Justice Kennedy added that “[t]he First 
Amendment protects speech and speaker, and the ideas that flow 
from each.”275  Considered in the aggregate, these statements em-
brace the proposition that speaker equality is a key First Amendment 
value.  Any court that would attempt to limit Snyder to non-media de-
fendant cases thus would be cutting decidedly against the grain of 
constitutional precedent. 
The bottom line, of course, is that only three years have elapsed 
since Snyder, and it will take many more IIED cases to fully sort out 
the metes and bounds of Snyder and its lasting impact on the tort.  
But as the majority of the cases examined here indicates, Snyder is—at 
least for now and at least for media defendants—proving to be, much 
like the Court’s defamation decision in New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van,276 another occasion for dancing in the streets.277  The dancing on-
ly stops —and then only thus far in one federal jurisdiction in Ala-
bama—when defendants, as they did in Holloway, sweepingly claim 
that Snyder protects even knowingly false factual assertions on public 
issues made with the intent to harm the plaintiff. 
 
271 Id. at 1291. 
272 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
273 Id. at 898. 
274 Id. at 899. 
275 Id. 
276 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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